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Taking reincarnation seriously: 
Critical discussion of some central ideas from John Hick 
 
Mikel Burley* 
 
School of Philosophy, Religion and the History of Science, 
University of Leeds, United Kingdom 
 
Reincarnation has not been entirely neglected in the philosophy of religion but it has 
not always been taken seriously or carefully discussed in relation to its role in 
EHOLHYHUV¶OLYHV-RKQ+LFNLVH[FHSWLRQDOLQVRIDUDVKHJDYHVXVWDLQHGDWWHQWLRQWRWKH
belief, at least as it features in the philosophies RI 9HGƗQWD DQG %XGGKLVP :KLOH
DFNQRZOHGJLQJWKHYDOXHRI+LFN¶VUHFRJQLWLRQRIWKHYDULHW\RIUHLQFDUQDWLRQEHOLHIV
this paper critically engages with certain aspects RIKLVDSSURDFK,WDUJXHVWKDW+LFN¶V
VHDUFKIRUDµFULWHULRQ¶RIUHLQFDUQDWLRQLVPLsguided, and that his distinction between 
µIDFWXDO¶DQGµP\WKLF¶IRUPVRIWKHGRFWULQHLVRYHU-simplifying.  
 
Keywords: Reincarnation; John Hick; Rebirth; Buddhism; Hinduism; 9HGƗQWD 
 
 
Western writers have usually not paid sufficiently close attention to eastern thought to do 
more than reject reincarnation as incompatible with accepted Jewish, Christian or Muslim 
teaching. However the Hindu and Buddhist conceptions deserve more serious attention.1 
 
,IDV-RKQ+LFNPDLQWDLQHGµWKHSKLORVRSK\RIUHOLJLRQLV not properly just the philosophy of 
the Christian (or Judaeo-Christian) tradition, but in principle of religion throughout history 
DQG WKURXJKRXW WKH ZRUOG¶2 then, given the pervasiveness of beliefs in reincarnation in 
numerous religious traditions, inquiry into these beliefs ought to have a prominent place in  
the philosophical study of religion. When we look for examples of such inquiry, although we 
do find a fair number, they tend to be undertaken without much careful consideration of the 
religious traditions within which beliefs in reincarnation have their primary place. A partial 
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 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, 368. 
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exception to this tendency is exhibited in the work of Hick himself, most discernibly in his 
Death and Eternal Life but also more fleetingly in other publications.3 While remaining 
ODUJHO\GLVGDLQIXORIZKDWKHWHUPHGµSRSXODU¶LGHDVRIUHLQFDUQDWLRQ4 Hick had a high regard 
for the philosophical conceptions of this notion that are formulated in the traditions of 
9HGƗQWD DQG %XGGKLVP +LFN QRW RQO\ FRQVLGHUHG WKHVH WR EH FRKHUent, but also came to 
believe that something quite like the Buddhist formulation is probably true. In Death and 
Eternal Life IRU LQVWDQFH KH GHFODUHV FDXWLRXVO\ WKDW µ7KHUH DUH IRUPV RI UHLQFDUQDWLRQ
doctrine which may be broadly true pictures of what acWXDOO\KDSSHQV¶5 and in later work he 
LQVLVWVWKDWµWKHUHPXVWEHDVHULHVRIIXUWKHUOLYHV¶EH\RQGRXUSUHVHQWRQHDQGWKDWLWLVµPRVW
SUREDEO\¶ QRW WKH FDVH WKDW RXU SUHVHQW OLIH LV RXU ILUVW6 This belief in multiple lives was 
FRQQHFWHG ZLWK +LFN¶V Voteriology. Roughly speaking, he maintained that everyone is 
heading for salvation in the end but that it takes numerous lifetimes for most of us to develop 
the moral and spiritual qualities that make us worthy of heaven.7  
Clearly, Hick was, among other things, a constructive theologian who devised his own 
vision of reality and of the purpose of human life. Doctrines of reincarnation constitute one 
area of traditional religious beliefs upon which he drew in order to construct a systematic 
worldview that has been a significant stimulus for other theologians and philosophers of 
UHOLJLRQ:KLOHDFULWLFDOVWXG\RI+LFN¶VRYHUDOOV\VWHPOLHVEH\RQGP\FXUUHQWSXUSRVHWKH
present paper contributes to an informed assessment of that system by closely examining his 
WUHDWPHQW RI UHLQFDUQDWLRQ 7KURXJK FULWLFDO HQJDJHPHQW ZLWK +LFN¶V LGHDV, this paper also 
aims to enhance the level of philosophical discussion of reincarnation itself within the 
philosophy of religion and to scrutinize certain assumptions that are often brought to 
philosophical inquiries into religious beliefs more generally. 
7ZR IHDWXUHV RI +LFN¶V WUHDWPHQW LQ SDUWLFXODU ZLOO EH GLVFXVVHG 6HFWLRQ I deals with 
+LFN¶VVHDUFKIRUµWKHFULWHULRQRUFULWHULD¶IRUVRPHRQHQRZDOLYHEHLQJZHOOGHVFULEHGDVWhe 
µVDPHSHUVRQ¶DVVRPHRQHQRZGHDG8 DQGH[SODLQVKRZ+LFNDUULYHVDWWKHFRQFOXVLRQWKDWµD
OLQNRIPHPRU\LVHVVHQWLDO¶WRGRFWULQHVRIUHLQFDUQDWLRQ9 Section II explores the distinction 
                                                          
3
 See especially: Hick, Philosophy of Religion, ch. 11; Death and Eternal Life, chs 16±19; Dialogues in the 
Philosophy of Religion, 11±12; An Interpretation of Religion, 367±69; The New Frontier of Religion and 
Science, 194±200; Between Faith and Doubt, 152±158. 
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 See, for example, Hick, Between Faith and Doubt, 152±153. 
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that Hick makes between, on the one hand, DµIDFWXDO¶FRQFHSWLRQ of reincarnation and, on the 
RWKHUKDQGZKDWKHYDULRXVO\FDOOVµDPHWDSK\VLFDOSLFWXUHZLWKRXWIDFWXDOFRQWHQW¶µDSXUHO\
PHWDSK\VLFDO WKHRU\¶ RU µDQ LOOXPLQDWLQJ P\WK¶10 As we shall see, these two features are 
FORVHO\LQWHUFRQQHFWHGDV WKHµOLQNRIPHPRU\¶FULWHULRQZKLFK+LFNWDNHVWREHFUXFLDO LV
also what on his view distinguishes factual from non-factual conceptions of reincarnation. In 
the course of my discussion issues will be raised concerning certain assumptions that seem to 
be operative iQ +LFN¶V DUJXPHQW QRWDEO\ WKH DVVXPSWLRQ WKDW D GRFWULQH¶V EHLQJ IDFWXDO
FRQVLVWV LQ LWV PDNLQJ DQ µDFWXDO RU SRVVLEOH H[SHULHQWLDO GLIIHUHQFH¶ DORQJ ZLWK FHUWDLQ
auxiliary assumptions concerning what counts as making such a difference. These 
assumptions OHDG +LFN WR GHQ\ WKDW ZKDW KH WHUPV µP\WKLF¶ FRQFHSWLRQV RI UHLQFDUQDWLRQ
µFRXOGEHRIDQ\SUDFWLFDO LQWHUHVW WRDQ\RQH¶, on the grounds that they lack a belief in the 
µOLQNRIPHPRU\¶ WKDW+LFN WDNHV WREHVRHVVHQWLDO6HFWLRQ III argues that this assertion is 
XQZDUUDQWHG ILUVWO\ EHFDXVH WKHUH DUH µP\WKLF¶ FRQFHSWLRQV RI UHLQFDUQDWLRQ WKDW FDQ
accommodate a version of the memory link, and secondly because there are reasons to doubt 
whether any memory link is essential to reincarnation beliefs in the first place.  
 
I. The search for a criterion 
7KHVHDUFKIRUµWKHFULWHULRQRUFULWHULDE\ZKLFKVRPHRQHOLYLQJWRGD\LVVDLGWREHWKHVDPH
SHUVRQDVVRPHRQHZKROLYHG>PXFKHDUOLHU@RIZKRPKHKDVQRNQRZOHGJHRUPHPRU\¶LVD
FHQWUDO SUHRFFXSDWLRQ RI +LFN¶V most sustained discussion of reincarnation.11 Aware that 
there are people who have claimed to remember former lives, Hick admits that if such claims 
are genuine, these memories would constitute one criterion of personal identity across 
lifetimes.12 He is also aware, though, that the vast majority of people have no recollection 
whatsoever of former lives, and the issue that concerns him is whether reincarnation could be 
a universal phenomenon ± as it is claimed to be by adherents of religio-philosophical 
traditLRQV VXFK DV 9HGƗQWD DQG %XGGKLVP ± rather than something that happens only to a 
small number of individuals. So it appears that another criterion is required. Bodily continuity 
is clearly a non-starter, as no one maintains that someone who reincarnates retains the same, 
materially continuous, body from one life to the next;13 so Hick holds that the continuous 
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 Ibid., 327, 356, 327. 
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 Ibid., 305. 
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 )RU+LFN¶VGLVFXVVLRQRIHPSLULFDOLQYHVWLJDWLRQVLQWRSXUSRUWHGPHPRULHVRIIRUPHUOLYHVVHHLELG±378, 
and Between Faith and Doubt, 153±155. 
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 It has been claimed that bodily characteristics such as birthmarks and wounds FDQ EH µ³UHLQFDUQDWLRQDOO\´
LQKHULWHG¶IURPDSUHYLRXVOLIH&KULVWLH-Murray, Reincarnation, 230), but this is not claimed to be because the 
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IDFWRU PXVW EH VRPHWKLQJ µPHQWDO¶ +H DVVHUWV WKDW LQ VSHDNLQJ RI D SHUVRQ¶V EHLQJ ERUQ
living for a certain time, then dying and being born again, µZHDUHSUHVXSSRVLQJWKHH[LVWHQFH
RIDFRQWLQXRXVPHQWDOHQWLW\ZKLFKZHPD\FDOOWKHVHOIRUWKHSHUVRQ¶14 
In the absence of continuity of memory, at least as a universal phenomenon, Hick 
considers whether the connecting link that he is seeking might conVLVWLQµWKHSV\FKRORJLFDO
FRQWLQXLW\ RI D SDWWHUQ RI PHQWDO GLVSRVLWLRQV¶15 In later work, he refers to this as a 
µGLVSRVLWLRQDORUNDUPLFVWUXFWXUH¶ZKLFKXQGHUOLHVand µZKLFKERWKDIIHFWVDQGLVDIIHFWHG
E\¶µWKHQRZFRQVFLRXVO\WKLQNLQJDQGDFWLQJSHUVRQDOLW\¶16 What Hick has in mind here are, 
principally, character traits; he is wondering whether, if someone who is now alive exhibits at 
least some of the character traits of a person who previously existed, this could be construed 
as criterial for tKH ODWHU SHUVRQ¶V EHLQJ D UHLQFDUQDWLRQ RI WKH HDUOLHU +LFN GLVFRXQWV WKLV
proposal, however, on the grounds that it is too permissive to be a viable criterion for two 
individuals to be counted as the same person. He notes that certain people who are alive at the 
same time have character traits in common, and to regard simultaneously existing people as 
QXPHULFDOO\ LGHQWLFDO µZRXOGEHDGLUHFWYLRODWLRQRIRXUFRQFHSWRI³VDPHSHUVRQ´¶17 And 
even in cases where one of the two individuals with common character traits is no longer 
alive, there are nevertheless liable to be many other people with those same, or very similar, 
traits; and hence the plausibility of regarding the two individuals in question as links in a 
chain of reincarnations is undermined.18 It is undermined because there is no principled 
reason for considering them alone to be linked by reincarnation when there are so many other 
equally viable candidates. Thus it would seem that all three of the criteria of personal identity 
countenanced by Hick ± namely bodily continuity, a link of memory, and continuity of 
dispositional structure ± have been ruled out, and therefore it may appear that belief in 
reincarnation becomes incoherent or at least lacks credible support. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
material constituents of the body remain the same. Hence it would be misleading to speak of bodily continuity 
even in these cases. For extensive work on the putative links between reincarnation and birthmarks and birth 
defects, see Stevenson, Reincarnation and Biology. 
14
 Hick, Death and Eternal Life, 304. 
15
 Ibid., 307; Philosophy of Religion, 134. 
16
 Hick, Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion, 11. See also idem, Between Faith and Doubt, 155±156, and 
The New Frontier of Religion and Science, 199. 
17
 Hick, Death and Eternal Life, 304. There are in fact cases of peoples who puUSRUWHGO\EHOLHYH LQ µPXOWLSOH
VLPXOWDQHRXVUHLQFDUQDWLRQ¶VHHIRUH[DPSOH0LOOV³5HLQFDUQDWLRQ%HOLHIDPRQJ1RUWK$PHULFDQ,QGLDQVDQG
,QXLW´± ,EULHIO\GLVFXVV VXFKFDVHV LQ%XUOH\³%HOLHYLQJ LQ5HLQFDUQDWLRQ´±277, but shall not be 
considering them here. 
18
 See Hick, Death and Eternal Life, 307±308. 
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In work subsequent to Death and Eternal Life+LFNGRZQSOD\VWDONRIµSHUVRQDOLGHQWLW\¶
across different lives, not least because he is aware that this terminology is problematic in the 
context of Buddhism. Buddhists ± or, at any rate, those schools of Buddhism with which Hick 
has the closest affinity ± typically deny the existence of a permanent self, and hence it is 
unlikely that they would readily accept a description of the relation between two members of 
a succession of rebirths as one of personal identity.19 Rather, as Hick acknowledges, they are 
PRUHOLNHO\WRVSHDNRIDQRQJRLQJµNDUPLFSURFHVV¶LQZKLFKFRQVHTXHQFHVIROORZDFWLRQV
some of which consequences will manifest in future lives.20 Intermingled in Buddhism with 
this notion of a succession of consequences caused or conditioned by prior actions is the 
QRWLRQRIZKDW+LFNFDOOVµDQHYHU-FKDQJLQJVHULHVRIPRPHQWVRIFRQVFLRXVQHVV¶21 As Hick 
REVHUYHVDFRPPRQYLHZDPRQJ%XGGKLVWV LV WKDWµWKHILUVWPRPHQWRI WKRXJKW LQ WKHQHZ
stream of life stands in direct causal sequence to the last moment of thought in the dying 
SHUVRQZKLFKWKRXJKWWKXVGHWHUPLQHVWKHQDWXUHRIWKHQH[WELUWK¶22 µ7KRXJKW¶KHUHFDQEH
construed broadly, and need not imply conscious thought ± or what contemporary analytic 
SKLORVRSKHUV RI PLQG PLJKW FDOO µSKHQRPHQDO FRQVFLRXVQHVV¶23 Hence, although some 
%XGGKLVWVGRVSHDNRIWKHµFRQWLQXDWLRQRIPLQG¶RURIDµVWUHDPRIFRQVFLRXVQHVV¶SHUVLVWLQJ
across reincarnations,24 the more prevalent view is that, for at least the vast majority of 
reincarnating individuals, the continuity lies below the level of conscious awareness. 
Despite his recognition, and indeed approval, of these points from Buddhism (which 
DPRXQW WR WKH LGHD WKDW µUHLQFDUQDWLRQ¶ RU µUHELUWK¶ FDQ EH D FRKHUHQW FRQFHSW HYHQ LI LW
involves oppugning the claim that, if B is a reincarnation of A, then B must be the same 
person as A) Hick persisted in talking of the need for something to be passed on from one life 
to the next. He became especially fond of the analogy of relay runners passing a torch from 
RQHSHUVRQWRDQRWKHUµ:HDUHOLNHWKHUXQQHUVLQDUHOD\UDFHWKHWRUFKKDVEHHQKDQGHGWR
                                                          
19
 It bears emphasizing, though, that there have been numerous disagreements between competing Buddhist 
VFKRROVRQWKLVDQGUHODWHGPDWWHUV)RULOOXPLQDWLQJGLVFXVVLRQVHH0F'HUPRWW³.DUPDDQd Rebirth in Early 
%XGGKLVP´ HVS ±172. For further discussion of Buddhist accounts of personhood, see Collins, Selfless 
Persons. 
20
 +LFNXVHVWKHWHUPµNDUPLFSURFHVV¶LQDPRQJRWKHUSODFHVBetween Faith and Doubt, 155, and Problems of 
Religious Pluralism, 26. 
21
 Hick, The New Frontier of Religion and Science, 196. 
22
 Hick, Death and Eternal Life, 345. 
23
 1HG %ORFN GHYLVHG D GLVWLQFWLRQ EHWZHHQ µSKHQRPHQDO FRQVFLRXVQHVV¶ DQG µDFFHVV-FRQVFLRXVQHVV¶ LQ KLV
DUWLFOH³2QD&RQIXVLRQDERXWWKH)XQFWLRQRI&RQVFLRXVQHVV´,DPGRXEWIXOWKDWWKHGLVWLQFWLRQLVDFOHDURQH
but, roughly speaking, to be phenomenally conscious of something is to have immediate perceptual awareness of 
it, whereas to have access-consciousness of that thing is for knowledge of it to be DEOH WR HQWHU LQWR RQH¶V
MXGJHPHQWVDQGDFWLRQVEXWZLWKRXWRQH¶VQHFHVVDULO\EHLQJLPPHGLDWHO\DZDUHWKDWWKLVLVRFFXUULQJ 
24
 See, for example, the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, interviewed in Bärlocher, Testimonies of Tibetan Tulkus, 117. 
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us and for a short time the whole project depends upon us. Our life thus has urgent 
PHDQLQJ¶25 But this image, of course, encourages the thought that there is somHµWKLQJ¶WKDW
remains the same from one life to the next, which is the very thought that many Buddhists 
have deliberately tried to discard. As one western Buddhist writer has put it, part of the 
SUREOHP LV WKH WHQGHQF\ RI SHRSOH LQ JHQHUDO µWR WR WKLQN LQ WHUPV RI ³WKLQJV´ UDWKHU WKDQ
FRQGLWLRQV¶ 
 
we think that for rebirth to mean anything, there must be a thing (e.g. a soul) that passes 
from life to life, but perhaps this static model is inadequate. >«@Drelationship can exist 
EHWZHHQWZRµWKLQJV¶VXFKthat the second arises in dependence upon the first, and yet no 
µWKLQJ¶SDVVHVEHWZHHQWKHP26 
 
It is unfortunate that Hick, despite being aware of this point, repeats the relay race analogy so 
frequently and uncritically. 
In the light of the apparent failure to find something that can both plausibly be held to be 
passed on from one life to the next and usefully serve to distinguish a relation of 
reincarnation from one of mere similarity of character traits, Hick raises the question whether 
the doctrine of rHLQFDUQDWLRQ LVDSSRVLWHO\ WKRXJKWRIDV µD IDFWXDODVVHUWLRQ¶DWDOO27 I shall 
come to his considerations on that matter in section II below. Here, however, it is important 
WR UHJLVWHU+LFN¶VFRQYLFWLRQ WKDWDW OHDVWVRPHYHUVLRQVRI WKHGRFWULQHGRPDNH µVXIILFLHQW
FRQQHFWLRQZLWK DFWXDORUSRVVLEOHKXPDQH[SHULHQFH¶ IRU WKHGRFWULQH µWR FRQVWLWXWH >«@ a 
IDFWXDOFODLP¶28 The connection with experience that Hick envisages is the link of memory. 
For although he had earlier admitted that relatively few, if any, individuals exhibit credible 
recollections of previous lives, there exists nevertheless, within both Hindu and Buddhist 
traditions, the hope of a liberatory state of spiritual awakening, a state termed moksha or 
QLUYƗQD, in which, or shortly prior to which, one may attain lucid past-life recall ± µD WRWDO
UHWURVSHFWLYHDZDUHQHVV¶29 ± which offers effective confirmation of reincarnation. As a classic 
                                                          
25
 Hick, An Autobiography, 226. See also his The Fifth Dimension, 248; The New Frontier of Religion and 
Science, 200; and Between Faith and Doubt, 158. 
26
 Nagapriya, Exploring Karma and Rebirth, 87±88. Occasionally, Buddhists do use phrases that suggest a soul 
being released frRP RQH ERG\ DQG HQWHULQJ DQRWKHU VHH IRU H[DPSOH 7VHULQJ :DQJ\DO¶V DUWLFOH ³7KH
5HLQFDUQDWLRQ RI .DWKOHHQ )UHL´ TXRWHG LQ %lUORFKHU Testimonies of Tibetan Tulkus, 755), but such 
phraseology is relatively rare among Buddhists. 
27
 Hick, Death and Eternal Life, 327. 
28
 Ibid. 
29
 Ibid., 388. 
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instance of such retrospective awareness, Hick cites the experience attributed to Gautama the 
Buddha, who is held within Buddhist traditions to have recalled details of countless of his 
own former lives as well as achieving insight into the multiple lives of others.30 
With this hoped-for remembrance of the chain of karmicly connected lives in sight, Hick 
declarHVµDPHPRU\OLQN¶WREHµHVVHQWLDOWRDQ\WKHRU\ZKLFKLGHQWLILHVLQGLYLGXDOVDVEHLQJ
reincarnations of specific members of an earlier generation and which thus speaks of a 
SDUWLFXODUVHULHVDVWKHVXFFHVVLYHOLYHVRIRQHDQGWKHVDPHVRXO¶31 µ>2@QHDQGWKHVDPHVRXO¶
is probably not a phrase that Hick would have used in his later writings, due to his more 
consistent mindfulness of the denial of a permanent soul in many forms of Buddhism. He did, 
KRZHYHUFRQWLQXHWRLQVLVWWKDWµWKHUHPXVWEHDQXQGHUO\Lng thread of memory, which may 
SRVVLEO\VRPHWLPHVHPHUJHLQFRQVFLRXVQHVV¶32 DQGZKLFKZLOOEHµDFWXDOLVHGDWWKHHQGRID
ORQJMRXUQH\WKURXJKPDQ\OLYHV¶33 LWLVWKDWWKUHDGZKLFKµFRQVWLWXWHVWKHFRQQHFWLRQRIWKLV
SDUWLFXODU VHULHVRIPRUWDO OLYHV¶34 Provided this memory link ± at least in potentiality ± is 
admitted, Hick finds the reincarnation doctrine to be coherently conceived as more than a 
PHUH µPHWDSK\VLFDO WKHRU\¶ µPHWDSK\VLFDO¶ EHLQJ XVHG KHUH µLQ WKH SHMRUDWLYH VHQVH¶ of a 
theory whose µtruth RU IDOVLW\ PDNHV QR DFWXDO RU SRVVLEOH H[SHULHQWLDO GLIIHUHQFH¶35 The 
theory does make an experiential difference, Hick maintains, because even if one does not 
currently recall any previous lives, one can legitimately expect to recall them eventually. 
It LV ZRUWK QRWLQJ WKDW +LFN¶V VHDUFK IRU D FULWHULRQ RI RQH LQGLYLGXDO¶V EHLQJ WKH
reincarnation of another ± HYHQLIWKHLGHDWKDWWKHWZRLQGLYLGXDOVDUHWKHµVDPHSHUVRQ¶LVVHW
aside ± itself relies on a metaphysical picture, the picture of there being some connecting link 
which constitutes the logical foundation for the reincarnation doctrine itself. Largely 
overlooked in this search for a criterion is any close analysis of the place that believing in 
UHLQFDUQDWLRQ KDV LQ EHOLHYHUV¶ OLYHV DQG KRZ LQ SDUticular it connects with certain ethical 
DWWLWXGHV DQG PRGHV RI HYDOXDWLRQ DQG DFWLRQ ,W LV QRWLFHDEOH WKDW +LFN GLVSDUDJHV µWKH
SRSXODUSLFWXUHRIUHLQFDUQDWLRQ¶36 ZKLFKLQFOXGHV WKHµLGHDRIEHLQJERUQDJDLQDVDORZHU
                                                          
30
 Hick (ibid., 379) quotes a discourse attributed to the Buddha from the 6DP\XWWD1LNƗ\D, 2.213±214, and also 
mentions a passage from the 6ƗPDxxDSKDOD 6XWWD (Hick, ibid., 396, n. 34). See also Hick, Dialogues in the 
Philosophy of Religion, 11, and Between Faith and Doubt, 156. For more recent translations of the primary 
material, see Bodhi, The Connected Discourses of the Buddha, 673±674, and Gethin, Sayings of the Buddha, 33. 
31
 Hick, Death and Eternal Life, 364. 
32
 Hick, Between Faith and Doubt, 157. 
33
 Hick, The New Frontier of Religion and Science, 196. 
34
 Ibid. 
35
 Hick, Death and Eternal Life, 356. 
36
 Hick, Between Faith and Doubt, 152. 
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IRUPRIDQLPDO¶± an idea which, aFFRUGLQJWR+LFNµKDVYHU\OLWWOHVHULRXVVXSSRUW¶37 ± and 
instead prefers to focus on more technical formulations of the doctrine in the philosophical 
OLWHUDWXUHRI9HGƗQWDDQGHVSHFLDOO\UHODWLYHO\HDUO\%XGGKLVP7KHUHLVRIFRXUVHQRWKLQJ
wrong with being selective in the sources that one discusses: it is impossible to discuss 
everything. And it is understandable that a philosopher such as Hick should be attracted to 
recognizably philosophical elaborations of the reincarnation doctrine. The notions of 
µFULWHULD¶DQGµVXSSRUW¶WKDWSHUYDGH+LFN¶VWUHDWPHQWRIWKHWRSLFUHPDLQSX]]OLQJKRZHYHU
Why, for example, shRXOGKHVD\ WKDW WKHLGHDRIEHLQJUHERUQDVDQDQLPDOµKDVYHU\OLWWOH
VXSSRUW¶" :KDW NLQG RI VXSSRUW VKRXOG ZH EH ORRNLQJ IRU" 7KHUH DUH after all, numerous 
stories in Buddhist and Hindu literature of people being reborn as animals. Indeed, a whole 
genre developed in early Buddhism of stories that purport to be of previous lives recalled by 
the Buddha himself, many of which were lives of animals or other non-human beings.38 Since 
these are mostly kinds of morality tale, which draw upon Indian folk traditions, they are 
SUREDEO\SDUWRIZKDW+LFNPHDQWE\ µWKHSRSXODUSLFWXUHRI UHLQFDUQDWLRQ¶%XWJLYHQ WKDW
they are part of the rich and colourful mix of factors that contribute to the variegated doctrine 
of reincarnation, it is unclear why they should be considered unworthy of serious attention. 
What Hick seems to be assuming is that there is an essential core of the doctrine, residing 
beneath extraneous accretions such as folktales and everyday modes of discourse. On this 
assumption, if we can hone down the doctrine to its core (which task consists in largely 
H[FOXGLQJ IURPRQH¶V DQDO\VLV WKHSDUWLFXODU FRQWH[WVZLWKLQZKLFKH[SUHVVLRQVRIEHlief in 
UHLQFDUQDWLRQ KDYH WKHLU QDWXUDO SODFH DQG LQVWHDG VWULYLQJ WR GLVFRYHU WKH µFULWHULRQ RU
FULWHULD¶ZKLFKµVXSSRUW¶WKDWEHOLHIWKHQWKHµWUXWK-YDOXH¶RIWKHGRFWULQHFDQEHGHWHUPLQHG
The assumption is natural enough, and is one that recurs in other areas of the philosophy of 
religion.39 ,W LV LQ ODUJH SDUW WKLV DVVXPSWLRQ WKDW JHQHUDWHV LQ +LFN¶V DFFRXQW D EURDG-
EUXVKHGGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQDµIDFWXDO¶DQGDµSXUHO\PHWDSK\VLFDO¶ZD\RIXQGHUVWDQGLQJWKH
doctrine of reincarnation,40 a distinction that risks glossing over fine nuances within and 
between particular versions of this doctrine. It is to a critical examination of that distinction 
that I now turn. 
 
                                                          
37
 Ibid., 153. 
38
 See Shaw, 7KH-ƗWDNDV. For further discussion, see Appleton, -ƗWDND6WRULHVLQ7KHUDYƗGD%XGGKLVP. 
39
 I am thinking here of, for example, the way in which many philosophers of religion try to determine the truth-
value of a belief in God (or the proposition that God exists), or of a belief in eternal life, while dealing only with 
YHU\WKLQO\GHVFULEHGFRQFHSWLRQVRIKRZWKHVHEHOLHIVIHDWXUHLQEHOLHYHUV¶OLYHV 
40
 Hick, Death and Eternal Life, 327, 356. 
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IIµ)DFWXDO¶DQGµSXUHO\PHWDSK\VLFDO¶FRQFHSWLRQVRIUHLQFDUQDWLRQ 
The task of understaQGLQJWKHµIDFWXDO¶±µSXUHO\PHWDSK\VLFDO¶GLVWLQFWLRQWKDW+LFNGUDZVLV
complicated by the way in which he sketches the two sides of the alleged dichotomy. Having 
LQLWLDOO\ FKDUDFWHUL]HG µD IDFWXDO DVVHUWLRQ¶ DV RQH µZKLFK HLWKHU FRUUHVSRQGV RU IDLOV WR
cRUUHVSRQG ZLWK UHDOLW\¶ +LFN IDLUO\ UDSLGO\ VKLIWV WKH HPSKDVLV IURP correspondence with 
reality to connecting with human experience E\ VXJJHVWLQJ WKDWVRPHWKLQJ¶VFRQVWLWXWLQJ µD
IDFWXDO FODLP¶ FRQVLVWV LQ LWV PDNLQJ µVXIILFLHQW FRQQHFWLRQ ZLWK DFWXDO RU possible human 
H[SHULHQFH¶41 From what Hick goes on to say, it is clear that the sort of connection with 
human experience that he regards as being especially pertinent to the question of whether the 
doctrine of reincarnation makes a factual assertion is that which I noted in section I, namely 
the connection of memory ± this being the connection that obtains between a person at a 
given time and that same person at an earlier time by virtue of the person at the later time 
being able to remember being the person at the earlier time. As Hick sees it, even if the 
person at the earlier time died before the person at the later time was born, we nevertheless 
have something (a memory of the past) that corresponds with past reality ± provided it is a 
reasonably accurate memory ± and also connects with human experience. (Although Hick is 
not as explicit as he might have been, we may assume his point to be that there is a 
connection with human experience in the sense that the later person undergoes the experience 
of remembering a previous life.) 
+LFNFRQWUDVWV WKLV µIDFWXDO¶ FRQVWUXDO RI WKHGRFWULQHZLWKRQH LQZKLFK WKHGRFWULQH LV
µWKHSDLQWLQJRIDPHWDSK\VLFDOSLFWXUHZLWKRXW IDFWXDOFRQWHQW VXFK WKDW LWV WUXWKRU IDOVLW\
makes no difference to the course of actual RUSRVVLEOHKXPDQH[SHULHQFH¶42 He then further 
describes this latter interpretive possibility as one according to which the doctrine is taken to 
EHµDQLOOXPLQDWLQJP\WK± comparable for example with the [C]hristian myth of the fall of 
man from a state oIRULJLQDOSHUIHFWLRQ¶43 Among the various points that could be made in 
relation to these brief characterizations are the following three. 
Firstly, since Hick does not regard metaphysical pictures as being invariably or 
necessarily devoid of factual content, we must assume that he is here singling out a specific 
kind of metaphysical picture. In a subsequent remark, which I quoted earlier, he indicates that 
KHFRQVLGHUVWKHWHUPµPHWDSK\VLFDO¶WRKDYHDWOHDVWWZRVHQVHVIRUKDYLQJXVHGWKHSKUDVH
µSXUHO\PHWDSK\VLFDO WKHRU\¶KH WKHQDGGV WKDWKH LV LQ WKLV LQVWDQFHXVLQJ µPHWDSK\VLFDO¶
                                                          
41
 Ibid., 327. 
42
 Ibid. 
43
 Ibid. 
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µLQ WKH SHMRUDWLYH VHQVH WKDW LWV WUXWK RU IDOVLW\ PDNHV QR DFWXDO RU SRVVLEOH H[SHULHQWLDO
GLIIHUHQFH¶44 This implies that there is, for Hick, also a non-pejorative sense of 
µPHWDSK\VLFDO¶ZKLFKZRXOGGHQRWHDWKHRU\ZKRVHWUXWKRUIDOVLW\would make an actual or 
possible experiential difference. In the absence of a variety of examples, it is not obvious 
what we should understand making (or not making) an experiential difference to amount to. 
But, as noted above, Hick does give, as one example of something that constitutes an 
experiential difference, the link of memory. Therefore ZHFDQWDNHLWWKDWRQ+LFN¶VYLHZD
theory (or doctrine or conception) of reincarnation is factual if it includes the claim that 
remembering previous lives is at least possible; and such a theory (or doctrine or conception) 
is non-factual ± i.e., empty of factual content ± if it does not include that claim, and includes 
no other claim concerning actual or possible changes to experience. The vagueness of this 
notion of making an experiential difference remains a problem for the distinction that Hick 
wants to make, and I shall return to this problem in due course. 
Secondly, given that it is a doctrine without factual content that he is contrasting with the 
IDFWXDOFRQVWUXDORI WKHGRFWULQHZHPLJKW ILQG LWVXUSULVLQJWKDW+LFNUHIHUVWRµLWV WUXWKRU
IDOVLW\¶ ,Q RWKHU ZRUGV ZH PLJKW ZRQGHU KRZ E\ +LFN¶V RZQ OLJKWV D GRFWULQH ZLWKRXW
factual content could have any truth-value at all. As we shall see, however, Hick does allow 
for different kinds of truth; for example, a doctrine could embody a moral truth or a 
mythological truth, or perhaps a spiritual truth, without its thereby embodying a factual truth. 
+HQFHLWVHHPVWKDW+LFNLVRSHUDWLQJZLWKDUHVWULFWHGVHQVHRIµIDFWXDO¶DFFRUGLQJWRZKLFK
D FODLPRU DVVHUWLRQ LV µIDFWXDO¶ LI DQGRQO\ LI LW LV LQSULQFLSOHYHULILDEOHE\ VRPH VRUW RI
µH[SHULHQWLDO¶PHDQVDQGKHLVRSHUDWLQJZLWKDUHVWULFWHGVHQVHRIµH[SHULHQWLDO¶DFFRUGLQJWR
which remembering something (or possibly remembering it!) counts as a mode of experiential 
YHULILFDWLRQEXWPDQ\RWKHUWKLQJVWKDWGRLQIDFWLQYROYHDFKDQJHLQRQH¶VH[SHULHQFHZRXOG
not count. (Instances of WKHVHµPDQ\RWKHUWKLQJV¶ZLOOEHFRPHDSSDUHQWLQP\GLVFXVVLRQRI
the following point.) 
7KLUGO\ZKHQ+LFNZULWHVRIµDQLOOXPLQDWLQJP\WK¶FLWLQJWKHLOOXVWUDWLYHH[DPSOHRIWKH
myth of the Fall, we may reasonably understand him to mean that what is, or could be, 
illuminated by the doctrine of reincarnation is, primarily, something about our ethical lives. 
In other words, the doctrine expresses something important about the human condition and 
the right way to live ± indeed, we might even say that it expresses something true about these 
things ± without our needing to describe it as true in a factual sense. This interpretation of 
                                                          
44
 Ibid., 356. 
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+LFN¶VQRWLRQRIDQLOOXPLQDWLQJP\WKLVVXSSRUWHGE\FHUWDLQWKLQJVWKDWKHVD\VWRZDUGVWKH
end of his chapter on Buddhist conceptions of rebirth in Death and Eternal Life, and by 
briefer passages in some of his later works. In one later work, for example, he makes the 
following observation: 
 
The doctrine of reincarnation is seen by some as a mythological way of making vivid the 
moral truth that our actions have inevitable future consequences for good and ill, this 
being brought home to the imagination by the thought that the agent will personally reap 
those consequences in a future earthly life.45 
 
The suggestion here is that one way of understanding the doctrine of reincarnation is as an 
injunction to see our relationships with others, including those that we shall never meet 
because they will live after we have died, in such a way that the consequences of our actions 
for those others are treated as no less important than the consequences of our actions for 
ourselves. An exemplar of something approximating this interpretation is J. G. Jennings, who 
is one among a small cluster of interpreters cited by Hick in this connection.46 Jennings writes 
of the Buddha that, although he inherited the doctrine of karma from the Brahmanical cultural 
milieu in which he lived, he transformed it from a doctrine of individual compensation and 
retribution into one of responsibility for the well-being of humanity and of the world taken as 
a collective whole. With the Buddhist denial of permanent individual souls, Jennings argues, 
comes the view that the consequences of our actions are experienced not by ourselves in 
future lives, but by the whole world community over time, and yet the discourse of future 
lives is retained as a narrative vehicle for that essentially ethical message.47  
Among more recent advocates of the sort of ethical interpretation of karma and rebirth 
that Jennings outlines is Nagapriya, the British-born Buddhist whom I quoted earlier in 
FRQQHFWLRQ ZLWK WKH SUREOHP RI WKLQNLQJ RI UHELUWK µLQ WHUPV RI ³WKLQJV´ UDWKHU WKDQ
FRQGLWLRQV¶ 1DJDSUL\D ZDYHUV D OLWWOH EHWZHHQ RQ WKH RQH KDQG GHQ\LQJ WKDW EHOLHYLQJ LQ
rebirth is necessary at all ± RUDWDQ\UDWHGHQ\LQJ WKDW LW LV µQHFHVVDU\ LQRUGHU WRSUDFWLVH
                                                          
45
 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion&I LELGµ7KHUHDUHVRPH+LQGXVDQG%XGGKLVWVZKRUHJDUG
WKHLGHDRIUHELUWKDVDQLOOXPLQDWLQJP\WK¶ 
46
 In an endnote in An Interpretation of Religion (376, n. 9) the following sources are cited: %XGGKDGƗVD
Toward the Truth; Nishitani, Religion and Nothingness, 173; Jennings, 7KH9HGƗQWLF%XGGKLVPRIWKH%XGGKD, 
xxiv±xxv; Deutsch, $GYDLWD9HGƗQWD, ch. 5. 
47
 6HH-HQQLQJV¶³*HQHUDO,QWURGXFWLRQ´LQKLV7KH9HGƗQWLF%XGGKLVPRIWKH%XGGKD, esp. xxiv±xxv, a passage 
from which is quoted in Hick, Death and Eternal Life, 358. See also Hick, Philosophy of Religion, 140±141. 
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%XGGKLVP HIIHFWLYHO\¶48 ± DQG RQ WKH RWKHU KDQG FODLPLQJ WKDW µWKH WUDGLWLRQDO %XGGKLVW
GRFWULQHVRI.DUPDDQGUHELUWK¶GHVSLWHSUHVHQWLQJµWKHPVHOYHVLQDVRPHZKDWDUFKDLFHYHQ
naiYH JXLVH¶ µQHYHUWKHOHVV FRPPXQLFDWH WLPHOHVV WUXWKV DERXW ZKDW LW PHDQV WR EH D
KXPDQ¶49 7KHDSSDUHQWZDYHULQJFDQEHDFFRXQWHGIRUKRZHYHULIZHQRWHWKDW1DJDSUL\D¶V
YLHZLVWKDWWKHµVRPHZKDWDUFKDLF¶IRUPLQZKLFKWKHµWLPHOHVVWUXWKV¶DUHFRQYH\HG is to be 
understood metaphorically rather than literally.50 Thus we can read him as saying that 
although it is unQHFHVVDU\IRU%XGGKLVWVWREHOLHYHLQUHELUWKLQDµOLWHUDO¶VHQVHWKHmetaphor 
of rebirth nevertheless carries an important ethical message that stands at the very centre of 
Buddhist teachings. The central truth, as Nagapriya puts it in the closing paragraph of his 
book, is that 
 
We bear responsibility to our future self [within our present life] and to other human 
beings through what we do. We have the power to transform the world for good or ill. It 
is through the compassionate exercise of this power that we fulfil our responsibility to life 
and transcend the confines of our ordinary mind. We place a feather on the scales of life 
that tips them towards goodness.51 
 
Although, when expounded in these terms, the ethical message in question sounds rather 
insipid, this in itself might tell us something about the use of the vocabulary of karma and 
rebirth within Buddhist traditions. What it tells us is that, even if we concur with Nagapriya 
that talk of karma and rebirth is to be understood metaphorically, it may nevertheless remain 
the case that these forms of language are indispensable and cannot simply be replaced by a 
µOLWHUDO¶ SDUDSKUDVH ZLWKRXW Fonsiderable loss of ethical force.52 What Max Black has said 
concerning attempts to paraphrase metaphors more generally is certainly applicable here, 
QDPHO\WKDWµWKHUHOHYDQWZHDNQHVVRIWKHOLWHUDOSDUDSKUDVHLVQRWWKDWLWPD\EHWLUHVRPHO\
prolix or boringly explicit (or deficient in qualities of style); it fails to be a translation because 
LWIDLOVWRJLYHWKHLQVLJKWWKDWWKHPHWDSKRUGLG¶53 
                                                          
48
 Nagapriya, Exploring Karma and Rebirth, 132. 
49
 Ibid., 142. 
50
 Ibid., 127. 
51
 Ibid. 
52
 ,W PLJKW DOVR VXJJHVW WKDW µOLWHUDO¶ YHUVXV µPHWDSKRULFDO¶ LV QRW TXLWH WKH ULJKW ZD\ RI FKDUDFWHUL]LQJ WKH
important differences in this area. But I shall not elaborate that thought here. 
53
 Black, Models and Metaphors, 46. 
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A further instance of how the doctrine of rebirth might be read as an illuminating myth is 
a conception attributHGE\+LFNWR%KLNNKX%XGGKDGƗVDDWZHQWLHWK-century Buddhist monk-
philosopher who, according to one commentator, is µZLGHO\ DFFODLPHG LQ 7KDLODQG DV WKDW
FRXQWU\¶V PRVW SURYRFDWLYH LQWHOOHFWXDO LQ WKH %XGGKLVW 6DQJKD¶54 Distinguishing between 
everyday uses of language and uses specific to the language of the Buddhist teachings 
(dhamma%XGGKDGƗVDLQWHUSUHWVµELUWK¶ZLWKLQWKHODWWHUFRQWH[WWRGHQRWHWKHDULVLQJRIWKH
VHQVHRIµ,¶RUµPH¶± i.e., the sense of being a distinct individual ± UDWKHUWKDQµShysical birth 
IURPWKHPRWKHU¶VZRPE¶55 Among the implications of this view is that notions of rebirth as 
VRPHWKLQJRWKHUWKDQDKXPDQEHLQJDUHJLYHQDSV\FKRORJLFDOHPSKDVLVµ$VVRRQDVDQ\RQH
thinks like an animal, he is born as an animal >«@. To think like a celestial being is to be born 
D FHOHVWLDO EHLQJ¶56 This feature of the view is comparable to certain interpretations of 
UHLQFDUQDWLRQDPRQJUHFHQW9HGƗQWLFSKLORVRSKHUVZKRZKLOHGHPXUULQJIURP%XGGKDGƗVD
RQ WKH ILJXUDWLYH VLJQLILFDQFH RI µUHELUWK¶ LQ other respects, would nevertheless concur that 
talk of rebirth in animal form is EHVWYLHZHGDV µD ILJXUHRI VSHHFK IRU UHELUWKZLWKDQLPDO
TXDOLWLHV¶57 
While it seems clear, then, that Hick has made a convincing case for there being a range 
of ways in which talk of reincarnation can be understood, there remains an important 
TXHVWLRQRYHUZKHWKHUKLVELQDU\GLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQµIDFWXDO¶DQGµSXUHO\PHWDSK\VLFDO¶RU
µP\WKRORJLFDO¶PRGHVRIXQGHUVWDQGLQJLVDKHOSIXOPHDQVRIUHSUHVHQWLQJWKDWUDQJHHere I 
QHHG WR UHWXUQ WR WKH SUREOHPDWLF ZD\ LQ ZKLFK +LFN GHSOR\V WKH QRWLRQ RI µH[SHULHQWLDO
GLIIHUHQFH¶ LQ VHWWLQJ RXW KLV GLVWLQFWLRQ $V PHQWLRQHG DERYH KH FKDUDFWHUL]HV µD
PHWDSK\VLFDO SLFWXUH ZLWKRXW IDFWXDO FRQWHQW¶ DV RQH ZKRVH µWUXWK RU IDOVLW\ makes no 
GLIIHUHQFH WR WKHFRXUVHRIDFWXDORUSRVVLEOHKXPDQH[SHULHQFH¶DQGFRQWUDVWV WKLVZLWK µD
IDFWXDO FODLP¶ ZKLFK GRHV LQGHHG PDNH D GLIIHUHQFH WR RU D µVXIILFLHQW FRQQHFWLRQ ZLWK¶
µDFWXDORUSRVVLEOHKXPDQH[SHULHQFH¶58 Given the vagueness of these phrases, however, we 
might wonder why the sorts of interpretations of reincarnation put forward by Jennings, 
Nagapriya and BuddhadƗVDFRXOGQRWOHJLWLPDWHO\EHGHVFULEHGDVIDFWXDOIRUWKH\GRVXUHO\
present ways of understanding reincarnation that connect with, and make a difference to, 
actual or possible experience. In the case of the interpretations put forward by Jennings and 
                                                          
54
 6ZHDUHU³,QWURGXFWLRQ%XGGKDGƗVD± µ6HUYDQWRIWKH%XGGKD¶´ 
55
 %XGGKDGƗVDToward the Truth, 68, quoted in Hick, Death and Eternal Life, 360. 
56
 %XGGKDGƗVDLELGTXRWHGLQ+LFNDeath and Eternal Life, 359±360. 
57
 Radhakrishnan, An Idealist View of Life, 300. See also Prajnananda, ³3UHIDFH´DQG0LQRU³,Q'HIHQVHRI
.DUPDDQG5HELUWK´ 
58
 Hick, Death and Eternal Life, 327; cf. 356. 
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Nagapriya, they make such a difference by highlighting our moral interconnectedness and 
responsibility for future generations, thereby contributing to an overall orientation of the 
%XGGKLVWSUDFWLWLRQHU¶VYDOXHVDZD\IURPVHOI-centredness and towards universal compassion. 
The sort of interpretation advanced by BuddhadƗVDPHDQZKLOHKDVWKHSRWHQWLDO WRFKDQJH
RQH¶V H[SHULHQFH E\ HPSKDVL]LQJ WKH RSSRUWXQLW\ WKDW HYHU\ PRPHQW SUHVHQWV IRU
relinquishing attachment to a fixed conception of self-identity and instead giving full 
acknowledgement to the impermanence of all things, including oneself, that is so strongly 
advocated throughout Buddhist traditions. 
(YHQLIZHWKLQNRIµPDNLQJDQH[SHULHQWLDOGLIIHUHQFH¶± as Hick seems to do ± as being 
equivalent to lending itself to possible experiential verification, it is unclear why this 
condition could not be fulfilled by the sorts of interpretations just outlined. Hick focuses his 
DWWHQWLRQ RQ WKH SRVVLELOLW\ RI UHPHPEHULQJ RQH¶V SUHYLRXV OLYHV ± RI HQMR\LQJ D µWRWDO
UHWURVSHFWLYHDZDUHQHVV¶DNLQWRRQHRI WKHVWDJHVLQ WKH%XGGKD¶VSXUSRUWHGHQOLJKWHQPHQW
experience ± and maintains that it is this hoped-for possibility that makes all the difference 
between a conception of reincarnation that someone could have good reason to adopt, and 
FRQFHSWLRQVWKDWFRXOGEHRIQRµSUDFWLFDO LQWHUHVWWRDQ\RQH¶59 )XUWKHUPRUHZULWHV+LFNµ,W
is only when we add memory ± even if this should only become conscious at the end of the 
series of lives ± that we have either the [B]uddhist, the [H]indu, or the popular conception of 
reincarnation or rHELUWK¶60 
There are two main problems with this emphasis on the importance of memory. Firstly, 
E\XWLOL]LQJDQRYHUO\FRQVWUDLQHGQRWLRQRIZKDWUHPHPEHULQJRQH¶VSUHYLRXVOLYHVFRQVLVWs 
LQ+LFNRYHUORRNVWKHSRVVLELOLW\WKDWµP\WKLF¶FRQFHSWLRQVRIUHLQFarnation may be able to 
accommodate the idea of such a remembrance; indeed, they may do so in ways that bring out 
HWKLFDODQGVSLULWXDOVLJQLILFDQFHVWRZKLFK+LFN¶VGLVFXVVLRQSD\VOLWWOHDWWHQWLRQ6HFRQGO\
by stressing that it is only when the prospect RIUHPHPEHULQJRQH¶VSUHYLRXVOLYHVLVSUHVHQW
that a conception of reincarnation could have any practical interest, Hick prematurely 
forecloses religious possibilities; that is, he forecloses the possibility of forms of 
reincarnation belief that have a cRKHUHQW SODFH LQ SHRSOH¶V OLYHV ZLWKRXW UHTXLULQJ DQ\
expectation of past-life recall. In this instance, too, Hick underplays the ways in which 
reincarnation beliefs are typically woven into a broader network of values and practices with 
strong ethical meaning. These two concerns will be elaborated in the next section.  
 
                                                          
59
 Ibid., 356. 
60
 Ibid. 
15 
 
III5HLQFDUQDWLRQDQGWKHµOLQNRIPHPRU\¶ 
:KHQ+LFNDVVHUWVWKDWµDOLQNRIPHPRU\¶LVHVVHQWLDOIRUDQ\GRFWULQHRIUHLQFDUQDWLRQWREH
of practical interest to anyone, he echoes a common thought, versions of which have been 
voiced by Leibniz and Locke, among others. Locke, whom Hick quotes at some length, 
FRQVLGHUVDFDVHLQZKLFKVRPHRQHPDLQWDLQVWKDWKHKDVLQKLPµWKHVDPH6RXOWKDWZDVLQ
Nestor or Thersites, at the Siege of Troy¶ and yet has no conscious recollection of having 
performed the actions of either of them. In the absence of such memories, Locke maintains, 
WKHSRVVHVVLRQRIWKHVDPHVRXOµZRXOGQRPRUHPDNHKLPWKHVDPH3HUVRQZLWKNestor, than 
if some of the Particles of Matter, that were once a part of Nestor, were now a part of this 
0DQ¶61 Leibniz, putting the emphasis more squarely on what one would have reason to 
desire, offers the following invitation: 
 
Suppose that some person all of a sudden becomes the king of China, but only on the 
condition that he forgets what he has been, as if he were born anew; practically, or as far 
DVWKHHIIHFWVFRXOGEHSHUFHLYHGZRXOGQ¶WWKDWEHWKHVDPHDVLIKHZHUHDQQLKLODWHGDQG
a king of China created at the same instant in his place? That is something this individual 
would have no reason to desire.62 
 
Hick maintains, as we have seen, that the sorts of problems raised by Locke and Leibniz 
can be overcome by incorporating into the doctrine of reincarnation the notion of latent 
memories of previous lives ± memories which, if not actualized before, may eventually be 
actualized as one approaches a state of spiritual enlightenment. However, given that Hick 
DOORZV DW OHDVW WKH FRKHUHQFH RI ZKDW KH FDOOV µP\WKLF¶ FRQFHSWLRQV RI UHLQFDUQDWLon, and 
provides an apparently sympathetic exposition of such conceptions as those offered by J. G. 
Jennings and Bhikkhu BuddhadƗVDLWLVIDUIURPFOHDUZK\KHSUHFOXGHVWKHSRVVLELOLW\WKDW
conceptions of these kinds could have space for talk of recalling previous lives. 
If we think, for example, of the sort of ethical emphasis given to the doctrine of 
reincarnation in the interpretations of Jennings and Nagapriya, we could imagine the prospect 
RIµUHPHPEHULQJRQH¶VSUHYLRXV OLYHV¶DV LQYROYLQJ WKH WKRXJKWRI LWVEHFRPLQJSRVVLEOH WR
UHPHPEHU DOO WKH GHHGV ZRUGV DQG LQWHQWLRQV LQ RQH¶V OLIH ZKLFK KDYH KDG SRVLWLYH RU
negative consequences either for oneself or for others, and of gaining insight into the further 
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UHSHUFXVVLRQVWKDWWKH\PD\KDYHIRURWKHUVLQWKHIXWXUH-XVWDVRQ-HQQLQJV¶LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ
LQSDUWLFXODU LW LV µGHVLUH >«@ that is >«@ said to tend to re-exist or be DJDLQ¶63 so, in the 
UHYHODWLRQ RI RQH¶V SUHYLRXV µOLYHV¶ LW FRXOG EH WKH VXFFHVVLRQ RI GHVLUHV SHUKDSV ERWK LQ
oneself and in others, that are brought to full awareness. 
)XUWKHUPRUH WKH LGHD RI EHLQJ UHERUQ LQWR GLIIHUHQW µUHDOPV¶ RI H[LVWHQFH ZKLFK Ls 
prevalent both within Buddhist and within Hindu traditions, could be accommodated by 
LQYRNLQJWKHVRUWRIµSV\FKRORJLFDOUHDGLQJ¶RIWKHYDULRXVUHDOPVWKDW1DJDSUL\DRXWOLQHV64 
This amounts to an elaboration of the mode of interpretation that we saw exemplified in 
%XGGKDGƗVD¶V FRQVWUXDO RI DQLPDO UHELUWK DV FRQVLVWLQJ LQ WKLQNLQJ OLNH DQ DQLPDO µVLPSO\
DFW>LQJ@ RXW RXU ELRORJLFDO DQG LQVWLQFWLYH XUJHV¶ DV 1DJDSUL\D SXWV LW65) and of celestial 
rebirth as consisting in thinking like a celestial being. On 1DJDSUL\D¶VDFFRXQWWDONRIUHELUWK
into the preta realm (the realm of ghosts or shades) DOOXGHV WR VWDWHV RI µH[WUHPH QHXURWLF
GHVLUH¶WKHµUHDOPRIWKHDQJU\JRGVLVRQHRIH[WUHPHMHDORXV\FRPSHWLWLYHQHVVDQJHUDQG
IUXVWUDWLRQ¶ DQG WKH YDULRXV KHOl worlds are states of debilitating suffering, pain, isolation, 
and mental illness.66 5HPHPEHULQJ WKHVH µUHELUWKV¶ ZRXOG LQYROYH UHFROOHFWLQJ WKH YDULRXV
psychological states that one has XQGHUJRQHRYHUWKHFRXUVHRIRQH¶VOLIHDQGDJDLQVHHLQJWKH
connections between these, the conditions that gave rise to them and the consequences that 
ensued. None of this seems to constitute an especially far-fetched or overly reductive 
interpretation of the traditional Buddhist doctrines, and in view of what Hick says about the 
LGHD RI DQLPDO UHELUWK KDYLQJ µYHU\ OLWWOH VHULRXV VXSSRUW¶67 I take it that, at least in this 
LQVWDQFHKHZRXOGSUHIHUDµSV\FKRORJLFDO¶UHDGLQJRYHUDQ\RWKHU 
We can see, then, that even if, like Hick, one considers the possibility of recalling 
previous lives to be essential to the doctrine of reincarnation, there is good reason to hold that 
ZKDW+LFNWHUPVµP\WKLF¶LQWHUSUHWDWLRQVRIWKHGRFWULQHDUHIXOO\FDSDEOHRIDFFRPPRGDWLQJ
talk of past-life memories, provided one is willing to allow logical space for multiple 
understandings of what it means to remember previous lives. And, let us recall, there is 
QRWKLQJ LQ+LFN¶V DUJXPHQW WKDWREYLDWHV VXFKDQDOORZDQFHKH VHHPVPHUHO\ WR assume a 
restrictive notion of remembering previous lives rather than arguing for it. There remains a 
question, however, about why we should regard an actual or possible memory link as being 
essential in the first place. The remainder of this section will examine a few illustrative 
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examples of how reincarnation beliefs PDQLIHVWLQEHOLHYHUV¶OLYHVDQGZLOOFRQVLGHUZKHWKHU
RUKRZWKHSURVSHFWRIUHPHPEHULQJRQH¶VRZQSUHYLRXVOLYHVSOD\VDQ\VLJQLILFDQWUROHLQ
these cases. 
My first example is from the autobiography of George Harrison (the popular musician 
DQGµH[-BeDWOH¶,QDQLQWURGXFWRU\SDVVDJHZULWWHQE\'HUHN7D\ORU+DUULVRQLVTXRWHGDV
saying the following about friendship: 
 
)ULHQGVDUHDOOVRXOVWKDWZH¶YHNQRZQLQRWKHUOLYHV:H¶UHGUDZQWRHDFKRWKHU7KDW¶V
how I feel about friends. Even if I have onl\NQRZQWKHPIRUDGD\LWGRHVQ¶WPDWWHU,¶P
not going to wait till I have known them two years, because anyway we must have met 
somewhere before, you know.68 
 
Although Taylor tells us nothing about the circumstances in which this was said, the 
sentiment that Harrison here conveys is of a piece with what we know of his strong affinity 
with certain Hindu forms of religiosity, especially those propounded by the International 
Society for Krishna Consciousness and the Self-Realization Fellowship.69 Similar sentiments, 
with regard to both friendship and romantic love, have been expressed by many others. 
Michelangelo, for instance, declared to Vittoria Colonna that he saw in her eyes the paradise 
where he loved her before,70 and Goethe wrote to Charlotte von Stein: µ2KWHOOPHZKDWGRHV
Fate hold in store for us? tell me, how did it fashion between us so pure and strict a bond? 
2KLQIDUE\JRQHWLPHV\RXZHUHP\VLVWHURUP\ZLIH¶71 From a perspective more closely 
aligned with Hindu thought, Swami Abhedananda remarks (in a book based on lectures first 
delivered towards WKHHQGRIWKHQLQHWHHQWKFHQWXU\WKDWµ9HGDQWDGRHVQRWVD\WKDWWKHGHDWK
of the body will end the attraction or the attachment of two souls; but as the souls are 
immortal so their relation will cRQWLQXHIRUHYHU¶72 
2IFRXUVHDOOWKHVHVWDWHPHQWVFRXOGEHUHDGµILJXUDWLYHO\¶DQGWKHUHPD\LQHDFKFDVHEH
questions to ask about the depth of belief in reincarnation that it embodies. For our present 
purposes, however, the important thing is that we see in these statements possible ways in 
                                                          
68
 Harrison, I, Me, Mine7KLVVWDWHPHQWLVDOVRTXRWHGLQ0DKƗUƗMDComing Back, 11±12. 
69
 )RUGHWDLOVRI+DUULVRQ¶VVSLULWXDODVVRFLDWLRQVVHH7LOOHU\Working Class Mystic. 
70
 6HH ³5LPH GL 0LFKHO $QJHOR %XRQDUURWL´ 9, LQ 'XSSD The Life and Literary Works of Michel Angelo 
Buonarroti, 231. 
71
 Goethe, Selected Verse, 71. I was prompted to looNXS*RHWKH¶VSRHPDQGWKHRQHE\0LFKHODQJHORE\VRPH
comments in Cioffi, Wittgenstein on Freud and Frazer, 85. 
72
 Abhedananda, Reincarnation, 28. 
18 
 
ZKLFK D EHOLHI LQ UHLQFDUQDWLRQ FDQ EH H[KLELWHG LQ D EHOLHYHU¶V OLIH ± ways that affect the 
EHOLHYHU¶VSHUFHSWLRQRIDQGUHODWLRQVKLSVZLWKIULHQGVORYHUVDQGclose family members. To 
tell a friend that you must have known one another in a previous life is one way of 
articulating the strength of friendship that you feel for him or her; it is not equivalent to 
VD\LQJ VLPSO\ µ,¶P YHU\ IRQG RI \RX¶ DQG WR TXRWH :LWWJHQVWHLQ IURP D VOLJKWO\ GLIIHUHQW
FRQWH[W µLW PD\ QRW EH WKH VDPH DV VD\LQJ DQ\WKLQJ HOVH¶73 It may, therefore, not be 
paraphrasable in terms that omit any allusion to reincarnation. But do we see in these 
VWDWHPHQWVDQ\QHFHVVLW\IRUEHOLHILQWKHSURVSHFWRIDFWXDOO\RUSRVVLEO\UHPHPEHULQJRQH¶V
previous lives? We might say that the sorts of feelings alluded to by Harrison and others are 
themselves being conceptualized as vague impressions of memory revived by the presence of 
the friend or lover. But the question to be asked here is whether there need be any hope of 
these vague impressions ripening into full-blown vivid memories ± D µWRWDO UHWURVSHFWLYH
DZDUHQHVV¶ ± in order for statements of the sort just considered to count as genuine 
expressions of a belief in reincarnation. 
It is, at least, not obvious why there need be any expectation, or even any thought of the 
SRVVLELOLW\ RI VRPH IXWXUH FRQILUPDWLRQ RI WKH FODLP WKDW RQH KDV NQRZQ RQH¶V IULHQGV RU
lover or family members) in previous lives ± a confirmation secured by remembering the 
lives concerned ± in order for statements to the effect that one must have known them in 
previous lives to be both intelligible and of spiritual and ethical poignancy. Of course, such 
statements cannot simply float free of all other ethico-religious commitments in the VSHDNHU¶V
life and still retain their sense, but, given a reasonably stable set of reincarnation-related 
EHOLHIVRQWKHVSHDNHU¶VSDUWWKHUHLVQRUHDVRQWRVXSSRVHWKDWDODWHQWRURFFXUUHQWPHPRU\
link must be present in order for the reincarnation beliHIWRPDNHDSURIRXQGµFRQQHFWLRQZLWK
DFWXDORUSRVVLEOHKXPDQH[SHULHQFH¶ 
A further kind of example of how believers in reincarnation exhibit that belief is those 
which involve reactions to suffering and misfortune. One source of examples of this sort is 
ethnographic research such as that carried out by Ursula Sharma among a Hindu community 
LQ QRUWKHUQ ,QGLD 2Q RQH RFFDVLRQ 6KDUPD UHSRUWV µ:KHQ D ERDW FURZGHG ZLWK SLOJULPV
bound for the shrine of a local saint sank in a lake >«@ and all the passengers were drowned, 
one informant remarked that there must have been some very sinful person aboard for such a 
WHUULEOHGLVDVWHUWRKDYHRFFXUUHG¶74 Although explicit reference to reincarnation is not made 
here, from what Sharma tells us about the surrounding beliefs of the community it is fair to 
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read it as suggesting that the sins in question, if not performed in the present life, must have 
been carried over from a former one. It implies that there must be a reason why the boat sank, 
over and above the quite mundane facts that the boat was probably overcrowded and in poor 
condition, even though the speaker of the remark may be in no position to fathom the details. 
Also implicit is an acknowledgement of the radical vulnerability to the vicissitudes of life that 
is so much part of the human condition. For even if there was one person on the boat who, in 
VRPH VHQVH µGHVHUYHG¶ WR EH GURZQHG WKHUH LV QR VXJJHVWLRQ WKDW WKLV SXQLVKPHQW ZDV
deserved by all. In view of the fact that the passengers were making a pilgrimage to a holy 
site ± this being a paradigmatically auspicious form of activity ± a thought in the mind of 
6KDUPD¶V LQIRUPDQW PD\ EH WKDW WKH VLQV FRPPLWWHG E\ WKH SHUVRQ ZKR LV NDUPLFO\
responsible for the disaster must surely have been horrendous, otherwise they could not have 
so evidently outweighed the meritoriousness of participating in a pilgrimage. Other believers 
in karma and reincarnation might have responded differently, declaring perhaps that everyone 
who drowned must have deserved their fate, since the law of karma is never capricious, or 
that, in this particular case, a malevolent demon must have contravened the natural karmic 
process and brought about the deaths of innocent people.75 
Again, for our present purposes, the important question is whether the reactions outlined 
above necessarily entail a belief in a forthcoming remembrance, or possible remembrance, of 
previous lives. It does not appear that they do. The reactions are indicative of how beliefs in 
reincarnation are integrated into peoplH¶VOLYHVLQVXFKDZD\WKDWZKHQPLVIRUWXQHVWULNHV± 
ZKHWKHULWEHGLUHFWO\LQRQH¶VRZQOLIHRULQWKHOLYHVRIRWKHUV± the believer will be inclined 
to understand that misfortune under the aspect of karma and reincarnation, and hence to see 
in the misfortune a retributive element that is liable either to be completely absent from how a 
non-believer would perceive the events in question or to take a very different form. As with 
the examples of believing that one has known a friend or lover in a previous life, the seeing 
RIVRPHRQH¶VGHDWKE\GURZQLQJDVDFRQVHTXHQFHRIVRPHWKLQJWHUULEOHGRQHE\KLPRUKHU
(or by someone else on board the same boat) is liable to be part of a broader framework of 
interconnected beliefs, values and practices; and that framework might include the 
expectation of actual or possible recollection of previous lives. But there is no reason why it 
must. Reactions to misfortune of the sort that have just been considered are intelligible 
without such an expectation on the part of the believer. Though they require a belief that 
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there is a connection between the misfortune and some action in a previous life (if not in the 
present one), they do not require the belief that we shall, or may, someday come to learn 
precisely which action is, or which actions are, responsible. 
$VXSSRUWHURI+LFN¶VSURSRVDOWKDWLQWKHDEVHQFHRIDOLQNRIPHPRU\µZHKDYHQRWKLQJ
left which there could be any reason to assert or which could be of any practical interest to 
DQ\RQH¶76 might contend that without at least a potential memory link it makes no sense to 
regard someone as responsible for what happens to them as a result of actions performed in a 
previous life, since there would be no coherent sense in which it would be them who 
performed those actions. We should be cautious, however, about assuming that a doctrine of 
reincarnation must postulate some connecting factor in addition to the connection that is held 
WRREWDLQEHWZHHQDFWLRQVDQGWKHLUFRQVHTXHQFHV7REHOLHYHWKDWRQH¶VFXUUHQWH[SHULHQFHV
are, in part, conditioned by actions performed in a previous life is, of course, to propose that 
there is a link between that previous life and that which one is now living; but why should the 
link be anything other than the conditioning relation between actions and their consequences 
LWVHOI"$VPDQ\EHOLHYHUVLQUHLQFDUQDWLRQVHHLWµ7KHQDWXUHRIHDFKLQGLYLGXDOLVPRXOGHGE\
WKHH[SHULHQFHVRIWKHSDVW¶77 including past actions, irrespective of whether there is or will 
be any remembrance of those experiences and actions. 
 
IV. Conclusions 
The principal conclusion to be drawn from these considerations is that doctrines of 
reincarnation are not well thought of as empirical theories or hypotheses which require the 
possibility of confirmation by means of memory in order to have a meaningful role in 
SHRSOH¶V OLYHV 7KH\ DUH IRU WKH PRVW SDUW FRQVWLWXWLYH HOHPHQWV ZLWKLQ IUDPHZRUNV RI
WKRXJKWHYDOXDWLRQDQGDFWLRQ:HFRXOGFDOOWKHVHIUDPHZRUNVµPHWDSK\VLFDO¶LQWKHVHQVH
that they are not grounded on empirical data. But they are certainly not metaphysical in 
+LFN¶V µSHMRUDWLYH VHQVH¶ ZKHUH WKHLU WUXWK RU IDOVLW\ ZRXOG PDNH µQR DFWXDO RU SRVVLEOH
H[SHULHQWLDOGLIIHUHQFH¶)RURQHFRXOGVD\WKDWWKHWUXWKRUIDOVLW\RIUHLQFDUQDWLRQPDNHVall 
the difference to the life of someone who believes in it; the belief provides the context within 
ZKLFKRQH¶VUHODWLRQVKLSVZLWKRWKHUVDQGRQH¶VMXGJHPHQWVDERXWKRZWRDFWDUHIRUPHG%XW
LQDW OHDVW WKHPDMRULW\RIFDVHV WKHUHJDUGLQJRIRQH¶VEHOLHILQUHLQFDUQDWLRQas true is not 
rightly described as regarding it as well established on the basis of experience, for the belief 
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LVLWVHOIVRPHWKLQJWKDWVKDSHVRQH¶VHQFRXQWHUVLQWKHZRUOGDQGZKLFKFRQWULEXWHVWRZDUGV
the formation of particular modes of lived experience. 
)RUUHDVRQVRIWKHVRUWMXVWRXWOLQHG,ILQG+LFN¶VVHDUFKIRUµWKHFULWHULRQRUFULWHULD¶RI
reincarnation to be misguided; it assumes that there needs to be some particular criterion, and 
that the criterion in question has to consist in some kind of verificatory experience. These 
DVVXPSWLRQVREVFXUHIURP+LFN¶VYLHZWKHPHDQLQJIXOUROHWKDWEHOLHIVLQUHLQFDUQDWLRQFDQ
KDYHLQSHRSOH¶VOLYHVLUUHVSHFWLYHRIDQ\H[SHFWDWLRQRIFRPLQJHYHQWXDOO\WRUHPHPEHUWKH
succession of lives that one has undergonH 7KH JUHDW YDOXH RI +LFN¶V WUHDWPHQW RI WKH
doctrine of reincarnation resides in the recognition that he gives to the variety of forms that 
WKLVGRFWULQHFDQ WDNH$V+LFNDFNQRZOHGJHV µWKHQRWLRQRI UHELUWK >RU UHLQFDUQDWLRQ@ LV D
IDPLO\ RI FRQFHSWV¶78 and among that family of concepts there are many important 
distinctions to be made concerning their various connections with such things as notions of 
personhood and of religious and ethical responsibility. As I have sought to show, however, 
the investigation of this variety of connections is not well served by attempting to impose a 
VKDUS GLFKRWRP\ EHWZHHQ µIDFWXDO¶ DQG µSXUHO\ PHWDSK\VLFDO¶ RU µP\WKLF¶ FRQFHSWLRQV RI
reincarnation. 
There are lessons here for inquiries in the philosophy of religion more generally. 
Although there has not been space to explore the connections thoroughly here, there are 
FHUWDLQ VLPLODULWLHV EHWZHHQ WKH µIDFWXDO¶±µP\WKLF¶ RSSRVLWLRQ WKDW +LFN VHWV XS LQ KLV
discussion of reincarnation, and the opposition that is often presumed to obtain between 
µUHDOLVW¶DQGµQRQ-UHDOLVW¶FRQFHSWLRQVRIUHOLJLRXVEHOLHIVDQGODQJXDJH&HUWDLQRIWKHWKLQJV
WKDW+LFN VD\V DERXW µIDFWXDO¶ FRQFHSWLRQVRI UHLQFDUQDWLRQ UHVHPEOH IRU H[DPSOHZKDWKH
VD\VHOVHZKHUHDERXWµQDLYHUHDOLVW¶FRQFHSWLRQs of other religious doctrines, especially with 
UHJDUGWRWKHLGHDRIWDNLQJFHUWDLQUHOLJLRXVVWRULHVRUGRFWULQHVµOLWHUDOO\¶79 Similarly, some 
RIZKDWKHVD\VDERXWWUHDWLQJUHLQFDUQDWLRQDVµDQLOOXPLQDWLQJP\WK¶UHVRQDWHVZLWKZKDWKH
has said about understanding the Christian notion of Jesus as God incarnate in metaphorical 
or mythic terms.80 A key difference, though, is that while Hick affirms a metaphorical 
construal of the Incarnation as the only way of making religious sense of this Christian 
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doctrine,81 he seems to write off so-FDOOHG µP\WKLF¶FRQFHSWLRQVRI UHLQFDUQDWLRQDV ODFNLQJ
µDQ\SUDFWLFDOLQWHUHVW¶82 
7KHVHDSSDUHQW WHQVLRQV LQ+LFN¶V WUHDWPHQWRIEHOLHIV LQ UHLQFDUQDWLRQDUH LQGLFDWLYHRI
the problems that are prone to arise when it is assumed that complex and nuanced religious 
DQGHWKLFDOIHDWXUHVRISHRSOH¶VOLYHVFDQEHSODFHGLQWRKLJKO\JHQHUDOL]HGFDWHJRULHVVXFKDV
µIDFWXDO¶ µP\WKLF¶ µOLWHUDO¶ µPHWDSKRULFDO¶ µUHDOLVW¶ µQRQ-UHDOLVW¶ DQG VR RQ :KLOH WKHVH
categories may offer useful starting points in certain instances, they are unlikely to take us 
very far. What is required in philosophy of religion, as elsewhere in philosophy, is careful 
attention to particular cases and a suitable degree of wariness about over-simplifying binary 
categorization.83 
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